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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
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25 NOV 1970

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
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# TRENDS

*in Communist Propaganda*

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25 NOVEMBER 1970  
(VOL. XXI, NO. 47)

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FBI'S TRENDS

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## TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 16 - 22 NOVEMBER 1970

Moscow (3834 items)

Luna 17 and Lunokhod	(3%)	20%
Asia-Africa Writers Conference in Delhi	(--)	7%
Indochina	(5%)	6%
[Air Raids on North Vietnam]	(--)	2%]
China	(4%)	4%
Middle East	(3%)	3%
Soviet Artillery Day	(--)	3%
International Students Day	(--)	2%
Hungarian Party Congress	(0.1%)	2%
Pakistan Cyclone Disaster	(--)	1%

Peking (2875 items)

Domestic Issues	(17%)	28%
[Deputy Wang Ching-wei's Death]	(--)	3%]
Indochina	(25%)	25%
[Air Raids on North Vietnam]	(--)	11%]
[Sihanouk Tour of PRC]	(--)	10%]
China UN Seat	(--)	5%
LA Territorial Water Rights	(--)	5%
Romanian Government Delegation in PRC	(--)	3%
Korean Party Congress	(4%)	3%
Pakistan Cyclone Disaster	(--)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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## INDOCHINA

Hanoi propaganda indicates that at least a tentative decision has been taken not to acknowledge Defense Secretary Laird's 23 November announcement of the unsuccessful effort to rescue U.S. prisoners thought to be detained at Son Tay, near Hanoi. A statement by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman refuting Laird's announcement of the U.S. mission was transmitted on VNA's service channel to its Paris office at 1328 GMT on the 24th, but within two hours an "urgent" service message advised VNA offices to disregard the statement and promised a new one. No new statement was forthcoming, and at 0305 GMT on the 25th VNA English reviewed a NHAN DAN Commentator article which obscures the substance of Laird's remarks, saying that at his news conference he "admitted" that U.S. aircraft had actually attacked a prison camp.

The initial Hanoi report on the 21st--issued by the VPA High Command--of U.S. air encroachments in the "areas of Haiphong, Quang Ninh, Ha Tay, and Hoa Binh" made only the vague charge of "provocative attacks" on "a number of populated areas" and said that in addition to civilian casualties a number of captive U.S. pilots were injured when a detention camp was hit by "bullets from the planes." Hanoi radio's report some four and a half hours later of the subsequent U.S. air strikes in Quang Binh and Ha Tinh provinces specified that "communications lines and economic installations" were hit. The U.S. action is labeled an "extremely serious" act of war in a barrage of propaganda including foreign ministry statements from the DRV on the 21st and the PRG on the 22d. Both Hanoi and the Front stress that the United States seized on the 13 November downing of one of its reconnaissance planes as a pretext to launch the air attacks on the DRV.

Peking has not yet mentioned the attempt to rescue American prisoners in the DRV, but the air strikes are denounced in a 23 November PRC Foreign Ministry statement which levels a general attack on the policy of the Nixon Administration and reaffirms that it is China's "duty" to give "all-out support and assistance" to the Vietnamese.

Moscow has noted Secretary Laird's announcement of the mission to rescue captive pilots only in brief news reports on the 24th which called the action a "serious new crime." Moscow's condemnation of the air strikes is at a lower level than that of Hanoi and. Peking--a TASS statement on the 23d which "completely supports" the DRV stand.

## INITIAL HANOI REACTION TO U.S. AIR STRIKES WELL ORCHESTRATED

Hanoi announced the U.S. air action against the DRV in what appeared to be carefully orchestrated fashion: The first announcement came

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in a Hanoi radio domestic service newscast at 0430 GMT on the 21st (1130 Hanoi time) which said that the air intrusions north of the 19th parallel occurred from 0230 to 0330 that morning, Hanoi time.\* The initial item on the newscast was a one-minute communique from the High Command of the Vietnam People's Army (VPA) announcing the action in the northern areas, claiming civilian and POW casualties, and congratulating the anti-aircraft and other armed forces and the people on the alleged downing of three planes and a helicopter. (VNA carried the VPA communique at 0614 GMT.) The radio broadcast also carried a commentary repeating the data in the communique and saying that this "extremely serious act of war" has exposed "the sinister plots concocted by Nixon and company" who are intent "on embarking on new military adventures." Hanoi radio at 0930 GMT reported that between 0900 and 1000 Hanoi time there had been U.S. air strikes at "communication lines and economic installations" in Quang Binh and Ha Tinh provinces and that two U.S. planes were downed, bringing the total to six downed aircraft that day.

Official protest against the U.S. actions came in a DRV Foreign Ministry statement carried by Hanoi radio at 1430 GMT and by VNA at 1625 GMT. Briefly repeating the charges regarding U.S. actions both above and below the 19th parallel, the statement adds that "rockets were fired on a suburb of Hanoi." It repeats the VPA's characterization of the actions as "extremely serious acts of war" and says they "brazenly violate" the U.S. pledge to halt the air strikes against the DRV and "seriously threaten" the work of the Paris conference. It also charges that there has been consistent provocative U.S. action since the bombing halt and recalls "the large-scale attacks" against a number of populated areas in Nghe An and Quang Binh provinces last May.\*\*

In the 1430 GMT broadcast, just minutes after the foreign ministry statement was read, a commentary took note of Secretary Laird's acknowledgment that the air strikes had taken place: "After admitting the criminal U.S. acts, Laird

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\* The first monitored Hanoi broadcast on the 21st at 0100 GMT (0800 Hanoi time), some five hours after the air action, made no mention of it.

\*\* The May strikes also were protested in a DRV Foreign Ministry statement. See the TRENDS of 6 May 1970, pages 4-5.

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still falsely maintained that the attacks were in retaliation, that they are acts of self-defense nature, of a limited duration and so forth." Laird's statement was deprecated along similar lines in the statement by the DRV Paris delegation on the 21st, but this was not carried by VNA until 0600 GMT on the 22d. A few hours earlier on the 22d, Hanoi radio broadcast the first press comment in the form of editorials in the party organ NHAN DAN and the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, but only the latter scored Laird's statements, taking issue also with his statement that U.S. planes had bombed only below the 19th parallel.

#### DRV CALLS FOR VIGILANCE, OBSCURES U.S. MISSION TO RESCUE POWS

While Hanoi has not acknowledged that the U.S. operation in the area of the capital was aimed at rescuing prisoners thought to be at Son Tay, there were indications in the initial propaganda reaction that the action in the North was different from that in Quang Binh and Ha Tinh provinces. Thus, no target was specified other than "populated areas" and a prisoner of war camp, and the foreign ministry statement pointedly said that the alleged injuries to American prisoners were from "bullets from the planes."

There was also a passage in the initial commentary on the 21st which could be read as evincing concern and as registering something less than satisfaction with the Vietnamese response to a surprise raid. Like the VPA High Command communique, the commentary hailed the alleged downings of aircraft as a demonstration of the Vietnamese armed forces and people's "vigilance, combat readiness, and determination to fight and win." It also claimed that although "the enemy attempted to take advantage of the night," the Vietnamese "armed forces and people--with calm and maintaining constant combat readiness--checked the criminal act of the U.S. pirates." But it added that the armed forces and people will "certainly direct even more serious, punishing blows" at the United States by "heightening their determination to fight and their revolutionary vigilance, assiduously improving their combat comportment, and having plans to fight the enemy and to take satisfactory precautionary and evasive measures everywhere and under all circumstances."

The NHAN DAN editorial on the 22d declares that the Vietnamese achievements "constitute a victory for the vigilance of our

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armed forces and people, who are ready to fight well day or night." It claims that "warning signals were given in time" and that enemy aircraft "were immediately intercepted by our air defense fire." But later it admonishes that "our armed forces and people throughout the country should be ready to fight the enemy day and night. The people's air defense tasks and the task of giving warning signals must be strengthened. Our way of life must be militarized." NHAN DAN goes on to warn the United States that if it violates DRV sovereignty "it will continue to be punished."

A Hanoi domestic service broadcast on the 23d (not yet available in full translation) goes to unusual lengths in describing the action of a number of Hanoi anti-aircraft units. The radio correspondent says that in the early morning hours of the 21st "many units" spotted the U.S. "piratical" planes and closely followed their course. He mentions the 43d, 44th, and 63d missile units and anti-aircraft units such as the 194th and 2d companies. Noting the fine record over the years of the 43d missile unit, he says that on this occasion they chose the proper time to launch their missiles and correctly estimated the enemy's maneuver. The correspondent adds that under the circumstances of intense combat, "our brothers sought to use the missiles sparingly and to fire only when they were sure they could hit the enemy."

LAIRD PRESS VNA's service channel from Hanoi to its Paris  
CONFERENCE office at 1328 GMT on the 24th carried a DRV  
Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement refuting  
Defense Secretary Laird's press conference announcement "that  
the recent U.S. acts of war near Hanoi were aimed at rescuing  
captured U.S. air pirates." But within two hours another  
service message instructed VNA offices not to use the statement  
and promised that another one would be issued.

To date no other statement from the foreign ministry\* has been monitored, and Hanoi media's first mention of Laird's press conference comes in a 25 November NHAN DAN Commentator article, reviewed by VNA English and broadcast in Hanoi radio's domestic service. NHAN DAN obscures the details of Laird's disclosure of the U.S. commando raid aimed at rescuing prisoners at Son Tay: It says that "after having flatly

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\* VNA's Vietnamese-language service transmission from Paris to Hanoi at 1640 GMT on the 25th carried a "statement" by the DRV Paris delegation. The full text is not yet available, but one passage notes Laird's remarks on "an operation aimed at rescuing pilots detained at a camp 20 miles from Hanoi." It also refutes Laird's claim that exploding missiles in the Hanoi area were

DRV, SAM's

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denied U.S. strikes on several areas deep inside DRV territory" and having said "that the report in our communique on the U.S. attack on a detention camp was erroneous," Laird at his press conference "admitted that on Nixon's orders the United States did attack a detention camp for air pirates at Son Tay, but the operation failed." Thus the reader would be left at sea as to what "the operation" was, and nowhere does the article mention the aim of rescuing American prisoners.

A prime aim of the NHAN DAN article seems to be to demonstrate that U.S. attacks were not confined to areas south of the 19th parallel. It says "attacks were directed against many places deep in the heartland of the DRV, even on the suburbs of Hanoi. Large-scale raids were carried out with as many as 350 aircraft shuttling from carriers in the Tonkin Gulf and bases in Thailand, effecting more than 2,000 sorties and bombing and strafing for 27 hours in a row--AFP and Radio Japan reports."

The article goes on to say that the air strikes on 21-22 November have multiplied the "barbarous crimes" and laid bare the Nixon Administration's "extremely bellicose and reactionary nature." Declaring that while the President talks of peace, he is in fact more bellicose than his predecessor, it goes on to say that "Johnson did not dare dispatch troops to invade Cambodia, but Nixon did" and that "Johnson had to stop the bombing, but Nixon has many times ordered air strikes, including extremely serious ones like those carried out early in May and in the past few days." The article concludes by reiterating Vietnamese resolve to persist in the struggle and cites the New York TIMES for the statement that "previous experience with aerial warfare deep into the DRV gives little ground for belief that it can change either the military or political situation. On the contrary, the bombing solidified North Vietnamese morale."

#### NOTION OF "UNDERSTANDING" ON RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS SCORED

Pervasive themes in both the official and lower-level Vietnamese communist comment on the U.S. air attacks are the insistence that there was no understanding in connection with the November 1968 bombing halt which would permit U.S. reconnaissance flights and the charge that Secretary Laird was preparing public opinion for the strikes by his 13 November statement on the legitimacy of U.S. reaction to attacks on reconnaissance planes. The DRV

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Foreign Ministry statement does not mention Secretary Laird specifically when it says that following the recent downing of a U.S. plane "the Nixon Administration" repeated the "fabrication" that there is a tacit agreement between the DRV and the United States on reconnaissance flights and said that the United States "is prepared to take appropriate retaliatory action." Similarly, the Hanoi radio commentary which followed the statement said that "after many days of preparing public opinion," the United States "today resorted to an extremely serious act of war." The PRG Foreign Ministry statement explicitly cited what it called Secretary Laird's recent "piratic allegations, arrogating to the United States the right to strike at the DRV."

The statement issued by the DRV delegation to the Paris talks on 21 November claimed the strikes were "part of a prepared plan against the DRV that was revealed by the Defense Secretary on 13 November and by the U.S. delegate at the 92d session" of the Paris talks on 19 November.\*

The forecast that the United States was paving the way for new acts was made in earlier propaganda on Secretary Laird's 13 November statement, including the 14 November DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement and a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on the 18th\*\* which concluded that the United States is "obviously feverishly preparing for new military adventures in North Vietnam."

#### FRONT PROPAGANDA RAISES QUESTION OF CEASE-FIRE

In addition to the PRG Foreign Ministry statement publicized on 22 November, the South Vietnam PLAF that day sent a congratulatory message to the High Command of the Vietnam People's Army which "warmly hails" the success of the army and people in the North in punishing the U.S. "criminal war acts against the DRV." Liberation Radio commentaries, among other things, voice determination to continue their struggle in the South and "punish" the Americans.

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\* On the 24th Vietnamese communist media publish the statements issued by the DRV and PRG delegations in Paris postponing the 93d session of the Paris talks until 3 December in order to express "indignation and protest" over the U.S. air strikes.

\*\* See the TRENDS of 18 November, pages 1-4.

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On the 24th, Liberation Radio broadcasts three radio commentaries rejecting the President's 7 October call for a cease-fire in place, two of which claim that the recent U.S. bombings of the DRV are additional evidence of the "deceitful character" of the President's five-point peace proposal. They also claim that the United States and its GVN allies have "repeatedly clamored for a 'complete, unilateral and prolonged cease-fire'" on the occasion of Christmas, New Year's and Tet--the Vietnamese Lunar New Year--and score this as another "deceitful trick." One of the commentaries notes that the PRG delegation in Paris has said that as long as there is no political solution to the Vietnam problem any cease-fire proposal--whether a standstill, unilateral, or prolonged cease-fire--"is only an evil trick aimed at legalizing the occupation of South Vietnam."

#### TASS STATEMENT SAYS U.S. AIR STRIKES VIOLATE BOMBING HALT

Moscow's reaction to the 20-21 November bombing raids on the DRV is highlighted by the TASS statement on the 23d which "denounces with indignation" the U.S. bombing and "completely supports" the DRV demand that the United States stop violations of DRV sovereignty and security.\* TASS says that statements by U.S. officials, particularly Secretary Laird, only "reaffirmed" that a "gangster raid" was made and that the United States thus "grossly violated its commitments to fully end the bombings of North Vietnam." It says that the actions "only lead to further aggravation of the situation in the whole of Indochina."

The TASS statement is followed by protest statements by several Soviet public organizations. A Soviet Peace Committee statement, carried by TASS on 23 November, says that the raids were "a provocation aimed at disrupting the Paris talks," and adds that the action exposes the "true nature" of U.S. "peaceful proposals." Moscow cites the statements by the DRV Foreign Ministry and by the DRV and PRG Paris delegations also as observing that the raids threaten the Paris talks, as well as the DRV Paris spokesman's denial that there is any "tacit agreement" under which the United States has the right to make reconnaissance flights over the DRV.

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\* The last TASS statement on Indochina was on 30 April, denouncing the U.S. incursion into Cambodia. Criticism of the early May bombings of the DRV had been included in a 4 May USSR Government statement read by Kosygin which was mainly directed at the U.S. operation in Cambodia.

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Moscow radio and TASS had promptly reported the VPA High Command communique claiming that various populated areas of the DRV were bombed and that there were casualties among civilians as well as in a camp for American POW's. Commentators assert that the outskirts of Hanoi as well as Haiphong were targets and commentator Tsoppi, in a 21 November foreign-language broadcast, refutes Secretary Laird's claim that day that only military installations and missile sites were attacked. A 23 November PRAVDA article by Kolesnichenko says that the New York TIMES, quoting an unnamed "high official," said that the real aim of the bombing was to "destroy important military and other objectives and also supply dumps."

Moscow propaganda takes note of Secretary Laird's 21 November assertion that the raids were a "response" to the DRV downing of the U.S. reconnaissance plane on the 13th, and scores him for trying to assume the "right" to send in reconnaissance planes with "impunity." Commentators recall Laird's earlier statement of the 13th "threatening" to resume hostilities against the DRV and they charge that the raids were thus "premeditated." The 23 November PRAVDA article by Kolesnichenko, datelined New York, says that "it has become known here" that the bombing raid was "planned as early as last May," and was undertaken at this time in connection with the "failure" of the Vietnamization program.

Many Moscow commentators charge that the raids show the "hypocrisy" of President Nixon's 7 October peace proposals. Ilinskiy in IZVESTIYA makes this point, and a 23 November broadcast in English to North America, saying that the bombings followed a U.S. peace initiative, recalls that the same thing happened last April when President Nixon sent troops into Cambodia 10 days after having "talked about a just peace." A participant in the 22 November domestic service roundtable discussion says that the raids show the "value of President Nixon's widely publicized recent peace proposals which are in reality nothing more than demagoguery and a propagandist cover to continue the aggressive course in Southeast Asia."

#### MOSCOW AND EAST EUROPE REPORT U.S. COMMANDO RAID ON DRV

Moscow acknowledges Secretary Laird's 23 November press conference announcement of the commando mission to rescue captive U.S. pilots in the DRV with brief TASS Russian and Moscow domestic

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service news reports at 0900 GMT on the 24th. Calling it a "serious new crime," the reports say that the action was carried out with the "personal approval" of the President but that Laird was "compelled to admit that the provocation was a failure."

A Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in English to Asia on the 25th reports Laird's press conference announcement of the rescue effort, including the fact that he introduced two officers connected with the operation. It says that Laird indicated that the operation was being planned at the time that the White House was making "the much publicized declaration" about seeking peace, and notes that the Secretary said that it was his "personal initiative which was eagerly approved by the President." The commentary assesses the operation as "the first attempt to spread a ground war" to the DRV, and speculates that the bombing raid may be followed by "broader intervention," citing Congressional alarm over this prospect.

Kozyakov, in a commentary broadcast in English to North America on the 25th, obscures the fact that the operation was aimed at rescuing American prisoners when he denounces the "ground invasion of the environs of Hanoi" as an obvious attempt to intensify the military conflict in Indochina, and charges that the United States has flouted international law by sending in "airborne troops." He does, however, criticize American spokesmen in general for talking a great deal about "protecting the lives of Americans in Indochina." And he does, in the course of reviewing Vietnamese communist peace proposals, note that the PRG has offered to discuss the problem of prisoners of war and that the DRV has also stated that "it will consider releasing United States airmen" if the United States ends "its aggression against the Vietnamese."

On the 24th TASS briefly reports that the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman made a statement that day in connection with a Laird press conference which denounced "extremely serious military crimes" of the United States against the DRV. The brief TASS summary does not make it clear, but it is apparently a report of the DRV statement which was carried in VNA's service transmission and then cancelled. The DRV

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Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement is again briefly referred to in a 25 November TASS report of reaction in Hanoi to Laird's announcement that an attempt was made to free U.S. prisoners. There has, however, been no available mention of the DRV "statement" on Moscow Radio.

A 25 November TASS dispatch from Washington reports Laird's appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the hearing being called because of "alarm among many Senators" about the "resumption" of bombing of the DRV and the "sending of an American landing party deep inside DRV territory." Laird, says TASS, tried to "justify" the bombings and to defend the "arrogant sally" by American commandos into the DRV undertaken "under the pretext" of rescuing captured American pilots. Laird "threatened tough 'countermeasures' in the future as well," reports TASS. A brief Moscow domestic service newscast on the 25th also reports Laird's appearance before the Committee and another TASS Washington dispatch on the same day reporting Congressional criticism also briefly notes that Laird appeared "in Congress" to defend the actions.

EAST            Most of Moscow's East European allies have briefly  
EUROPE        reported Laird's statement on the commando raid.

A commentary in Warsaw's TRYBUNA LUDU, summarized by PAP on the 25th, calls the raid "an additional glaring act of aggression on the territory of a sovereign state" and recalls that one of the PRG's eight points suggests starting a discussion of the problem of POWs after the United States consents to withdraw its troops. Brief Bucharest domestic service commentaries on the 24th and 25th say that the commando operation gives "new dimensions" to the bombing attack against the DRV. The talk on the 25th adds that "commentators" stress the "gravity of the decision" taken by the U.S. Administration in launching the mission. Both reports note that U.S. Senators deplored the action and the commentary on the 25th also says that UN Secretary General U Thant criticized the bombing raids.

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**PRC FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT SCORES BOMBING, NIXON POLICIES**

The PRC Foreign Ministry statement sees the air strikes against North Vietnam as evidence that "the words of U.S. imperialism have never counted, particularly those of the Nixon government." Citing other U.S. actions in Indochina to document this point, the statement charges that President Nixon's "so-called era of negotiation is but to cover up aggression under the camouflage of negotiation." It asserts that the Vietnamese will not be cowed by bombs and that the United States cannot break the Vietnamese people's "iron will" to fight.

The statement declares that the struggle in Vietnam and other parts of Indochina is "our struggle" and adds that "it is the bounden internationalist duty of the Chinese people to give all-out support and assistance to the peoples of Vietnam and other Indochinese countries." The 4 May PRC Government statement on the U.S. incursion into Cambodia and air strikes against the DRV similarly pledged "all-out" aid, but it more strongly suggested Chinese concern by claiming that the U.S. actions were "frantic provocations against the Chinese people."

Prior to the release of the foreign ministry statement, Peking media late on the 21st acknowledged the air strikes against the DRV by publicizing the 21 November VPA High Command communique. The text of the communique and the DRV Foreign Ministry statement were broadcast by Peking and published in PEOPLE'S DAILY on the 22d, along with an editorial denouncing the raids.

The 22 November PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, unlike the PRC Foreign Ministry statement, reports and rejects Defense Secretary Laird's statement that the United States was conducting limited-duration protective reaction air strikes in response to the downing of a reconnaissance plane over the DRV on the 13th. The editorial claims that DRV attacks on U.S. planes are only justified self-defense against "piratical acts" and asserts that it is "more ridiculous" to attempt to "conceal U.S. imperialism's crimes of aggression on the pretext of 'limited duration.' Aggression is aggression, after all." Alluding to President Nixon's five-point peace proposal, the editorial declares that the "new war provocations" have "punctured the fraud"

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of the President's "new proposals for peace" and have revealed that his talk about a cease-fire and peace is "a smokescreen" to shield U.S. expansion of the war in Indochina. The editorial adds that the United States tried to extricate itself from "defeat" in Indochina by "resorting to peace fraud," but that "when the peace fraud went bankrupt" the United States "again turned to a new war adventure."

Peking media have not acknowledged the U.S. announcement of the unsuccessful attempt to rescue U.S. prisoners of war. This silence is pointed up in a 25 November NCNA commentary which cites, as evidence of opposition to the bombing of the DRV, Western news agency reports that "the 'unsuccessful assault' caused a sharp row in the Senate." The commentary also rejects the notion of a U.S.-DRV agreement allowing reconnaissance flights, declaring that "it is just unimaginable that a victim of aggression would allow unscrupulous, random reconnaissance flights over her territorial air by planes of aggressors."

Before Peking reacted to the bombing, a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the 21st had warned of the possibility of some new U.S. action in Indochina. The editorial followed up NCNA comment on the 16th on Secretary Laird's 13 November remarks on the downing of the U.S. reconnaissance plane. It charged that Laird made "truculent ravings not only to cover up the U.S. imperialist crimes of aggression against the Vietnamese people, but also to seek pretexts and prepare public opinion for further expanding the war . . . and risking new military adventures."

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## PARIS TALKS: DRV DENIES DRV-U.S. UNDERSTANDING ON BOMBING HALT

U.S. RECONNAISSANCE      The VNA account of the 92d session of the Paris talks on 19 November, postponed last week because of de Gaulle's funeral, says Xuan Thuy presented evidence--including continued alleged violations of DRV sovereignty and security--that the United States is actually prolonging and extending the war rather than ending it and bringing home U.S. troops as Washington claims to be doing. According to VNA, he also took the occasion to "affirm once again," as "chief of the DRV delegation to the official conversations" with the U.S. Government delegate from May to October 1968, that the U.S. cessation of "bombing, shelling, and other acts of war" against the DRV was "completely unconditional and there was absolutely no 'understanding' whatsoever." That, he said, is why the DRV has "always strongly protested against each violation engagement by the United States."

Strangely, VNA does not note that Thuy referred to the downing of a U.S. reconnaissance plane and to the remarks by Secretary Laird on 13 November or that he cited the passage in the 14 November DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement rejecting the notion of a DRV-U.S. "tacit agreement."

The VNA account brushes aside the allied delegates' remarks in now customary fashion, charging that "in their speeches today the delegates of the United States and the Saigon puppet administration still stuck to their reactionary stand." Thus VNA does not mention that Ambassador Bruce, along with a brief rundown of President Nixon's five points, made a statement on U.S. reconnaissance flights over North Vietnam in which he said the United States agreed to stop the bombing and "acts using force." (Bruce stated that reconnaissance is not an act involving the use of force and is essential for the security of U.S. forces in the South. He added that the United States will "take whatever measures are necessary to protect reconnaissance aircraft and their pilots" and affirmed that U.S. policy in regard to such flights and to measures of protective reaction remains unchanged.)

Although VNA ignores Bruce's remarks, a Hanoi radio commentary on the 20th scores him for "shamelessly" stating that reconnaissance flights are not acts of violence and for "insolently" saying they are necessary for U.S. troop security in the South. It cites the 14 November DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement as calling such flights violations of DRV independence

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and sovereignty, and it expresses determination to punish such violations. It concludes that the way to ensure U.S. troop safety is an immediate and unconditional withdrawal.

WAR PROLONGATION, VNA reports that in addition to citing U.S. VIETNAMIZATION violations of DRV sovereignty and security, Thuy saw evidence of intent to prolong the war in many other aspects of U.S. policy--Vietnamization, the refusal to fix a time limit for total troop withdrawal, maintenance of the Saigon administration, and expansion of the war in Laos and Cambodia. Thuy argued that it would be in the U.S. as well as Vietnamese interest if the Nixon Administration gave a serious response to the PRG eight-point initiative of 17 September. He again claimed that while the United States maintains the Saigon administration, "all strata" of the Vietnamese population, "including many members of the Saigon administration, are resolutely demanding the replacement of its leaders and formation of a new representative administration."

VNA and LPA note that Nguyen Van Tien, deputy head of the PRG delegation, substituting for Mme. Binh,\* "severely condemned the Nixon Administration for unceasingly stepping up Vietnamization" and "committing untold crimes against the South Vietnamese people." The accounts, ignoring most of Tien's documentation, note that he also denounced the United States and Saigon for "taking advantage of the recent tragic flood to conduct sweep operations" to implement pacification programs, "sowing death and suffering amongst the population."

VNA says that after "exposing the fascist nature of the Thieu-Ky-Khiem administration, which is increasing repression, persecution, and arrests against all those who demand peace, independence, neutrality, democracy, and the improvement of living conditions," Tien stressed that the United States can "never make the puppet army and administration as 'strong' as it would like in order to use it as a tool" for Vietnamization.

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\* In the post-session briefing the PRG spokesman explained that Mme. Binh was absent because she was "slightly fatigued" following her return from her visit to Bulgaria.

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VNA says Tien affirmed that the 10-point solution and the 17 September statement of the PRG constitute the correct basis for settlement of the Vietnam problem, but it does note that he spelled out the two points in the settlement program calling for U.S. agreement to withdraw its troops before 30 June 1971 and forming a provisional coalition government. Tien concluded that "war or peace in South Vietnam depends entirely upon the Nixon's Administration's attitude."

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**RGNU PRIME MINISTER PENN NOUTH VISITS DRV**

A visit to the DRV by an RGNU delegation led by Prime Minister Penn Nouth from 12 to 21 November was first reported by VNA on the 21st. Invited by Pham Van Dong, the delegation included several RGNU ministers and vice ministers. The group's departure from Hanoi was reported by VNA on 22 November and its return to Peking was noted by NCNA on the 23d. The joint communique, released by VNA on the 22d, says the delegation met with DRV President Ton Duc Thang and VWP First Secretary Le Duan, who reaffirmed their "firm and unreserved support" for the Cambodian people's struggle. The RGNU group also met with Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, Nguyen Duy Trinh, and Hoang Quoc Viet.

The communique says Pham Van Dong and Penn Nouth "reviewed the situation of the struggle of the two peoples against U.S. aggression since the visit of Head of State Norodom Sihanouk in early June 1970."\* The two prime ministers "categorically rejected" President Nixon's five-point peace plan, it says, and reaffirmed the commitments enunciated in the 25 April statement of the Indochinese People's Summit Conference and the 7 June joint communique on Sihanouk's visit.

**VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ATTENTION TO FIGHTING IN CAMBODIA**

Vietnamese communist reports on the fighting in Cambodia highlight the action against government forces around the provincial capital of Kompong Cham and claim that recent South Vietnamese operations in Cambodia have failed. A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article, summarized by VNA on the 20th, links action along Highway 7 in the Kompong Cham area with the attacks further to the northwest on government troops along Highway 6. The paper claims that the government's clearing operation on Highway 6 has been "stalemated" and that "tens of thousands of its troops were encircled and decimated" in the Teang Kauk area. At the same time, it says, other troops of the Lon Nol regime were "wiped out in Kompong Cham provincial capital and along Highway 7" and "the Saigon puppet troops that came to their help were themselves battered in Snuol and Memot."

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\* Sihanouk visited the DRV from 25 May to 8 June. See the TRENDS of 27 May, pages 12-13, and 10 June, pages 7-8.

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On the 19th VNA carried an AKI commentary claiming that the "Cambodian armed forces" in the Memot and Snuol areas had scored a "brilliant victory" and caused the failure of ARVN operation "Total Victory." It cites specific action and claims that, all told, from 26 October to 8 November the Cambodian armed forces in Snuol killed or wounded nearly 1,100 Saigon troops and that nearly 400 GVN troops were killed or wounded in Memot.

### TROOPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM HIGHLANDS TOLD TO GROW THEIR FOOD

The need to commit communist troops in the western highlands of South Vietnam to the cultivation of food crops was acknowledged in a 13 November Liberation Radio broadcast which suggested, with unusual frankness, that the allies have been successful in cutting off the mountain "liberated areas" from a food supply in the lowlands and described in detail the problems faced by communist troops in raising their own food. The assignment of agricultural tasks to troops is rarely discussed in the propaganda; on 22 July, however, Hanoi broadcast an article--"sent" from an author in the South--which praised agricultural production achievements of the armed forces in central Trung Bo.

The 13 November broadcast took note of the allied economic blockade of the "liberated western highlands area" and allied sweeps and aerial destruction of crops. It said that "leading organs" at various levels had motivated cadres and combatants to "step up cultivation and animal husbandry and struggle for self-sufficiency by securing a large quantity of food for themselves in order to reduce the need for supplies from higher echelons." Stating that every level now has an organization in charge of stepping up production, the broadcast specified that such organizations exist in "province and district units and main-force and regional units . . . and in rear service units."

Reviewing efforts to overcome production problems, the broadcast noted that "under the critical circumstances in which we have to carry out a constant struggle against the enemy, a big problem has arisen: obtaining the labor force for production." It indicated that all cadres and combatants should participate in production and that "each unit is authorized to use a certain percentage of its men to care for planting and animal husbandry," adding that some organs can carry on production in their spare time at night and that wounded combatants can also help.

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The acquisition of seeds and tools has also been a problem, according to the broadcast. It noted that "combatants of various units and organs marched great distances, which sometimes took them several days to traverse, to get to areas adjacent to big roads in order to remove scrap iron and steel from enemy bridges and vehicles destroyed by our forces and bring them back" to be forged into agricultural tools. The armed forces in the area, the broadcast stated, "have organized various groups of cadres and combatants who have spent months" looking for new rice seeds and breeds of domestic animals. It added that "combat units" have also tried to buy seeds and bring them back to the highlands.

The broadcast went on to urge the protection of the crops against natural calamities and allied actions, and it concluded on a somber note: "By increasing production, the western highlands troops can store sufficient food needed during the pre-harvest time and for medical treatment drives and for improving the health of the weaker soldiers. With sufficient food, the battlefield can feed troops properly and maintain the proper number of fighting troops under difficult circumstances."

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## SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

## STATE RELATIONS IMPROVE; SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES PERSIST

Signs of progress have recently been registered in restoring the forms of normal intergovernmental relations between Moscow and Peking. Ambassadorial-level relations were renewed for the first time in four years with the arrival in Moscow on 22 November of a new Chinese ambassador, Liu Hsin-chuan; Soviet Ambassador Tolstikov had arrived in Peking on 10 October. On 22 November a new trade agreement, the first since 1967, was signed in Peking by a Soviet deputy minister of foreign trade, whose delegation had arrived 10 days earlier, and his Chinese counterpart.

On the other hand, there are signs of disagreement over the terms of the trade accord, and neither side has sought to indicate any breakthrough on substantive issues in their border dispute or on other political and ideological differences. Peking's announcement of the arrival of the Soviet trade delegation on 12 November said it came for talks on trade for 1970; Moscow's report did not specify a period of the prospective agreement. Both sides' announcements on the agreement signed on the 22d failed to indicate the period covered, and Peking's added that the two sides "will continue to exchange views" on mutual trade. Difficulties over the border problem seem reflected in the absence of any announcement of agreement reached at the annual session of the joint river navigation commission which opened on 10 July. Last year a limited accord was announced in August. The last previous session, in 1967, had broken up over what the Soviets charged was a Chinese attempt to raise territorial questions at the meeting.

That the ideological schism remains unbridged was demonstrated anew by the CCP's failure to send a delegation to the current Hungarian party congress, attended by Brezhnev. Hungarian party chief Kadar took note of current developments in observing at the congress that state relations between his country and the PRC have improved "to some extent" despite "serious and numerous" political and ideological differences. In his address at the congress on the 24th Brezhnev failed to mention the Chinese while praising the Hungarians for their role in arranging the June 1969 international communist conference, a "major event" which "promoted the cohesion of communist ranks."

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SOVIET COMMENT Moscow has continued the pattern of limiting references to China in the central daily press to reports on measures reflecting a restoration of normal state relations. Polemical pressure on the Chinese and restatements of Moscow's ideological positions persist in Soviet comment broadcast to the Chinese and in occasional commentaries in periodicals. An example of the latter is an article in the CPSU Central Committee journal AGITATOR pegged to the anniversary of the 1960 international party conference and written by V. Tolstikov, apparently the new ambassador to the PRC but not so identified in the journal. (This issue of the journal was signed to press on 6 October, three weeks after Tolstikov's appointment had been confirmed officially.) While attacking the Chinese for schismatic activities in the past decade, the article also refers to the Soviet party's efforts to restore relations with the CCP and says the CPSU "is still pursuing" a policy toward the Chinese based on a long-term view.

Soviet statements since the opening of the Sino-Soviet talks have carefully distinguished between state and party relations, confining calls for improvement to the state level. Tolstikov's article might be construed as a hint of Soviet hopes for an eventual ideological accommodation, perhaps in the spirit of the compromise achieved at the 1960 conference. The article's discussion of the 1969 conference, at which a bandwagon anti-Peking campaign took place, notably fails to mention the Chinese.

Suslov, who presided over the replacement of Tolstikov as Leningrad regional party chief, promised in his October Revolution anniversary speech that the Soviets would stand firm on their ideological positions. The tough line taken in Soviet broadcasts to the Chinese seems to uphold that promise. Comment timed for the anniversary of the 1960 conference, for example, has rebuked Peking for violating doctrines to which its representatives had subscribed at the conference. A commentary in Mandarin on the 20th took issue with Peking's revision of the theory of contradictions as being designed to pit the national liberation movement against Soviet "social imperialism." Another Mandarin broadcast, on the 22d, accused Peking of reneging on its commitments at the 1960 conference by pursuing splitting tactics and seeking to promote a pro-Chinese international communist movement. The commentary invoked the 1969 conference as a forum where Peking was condemned by the fraternal parties.

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Other recent comment beamed to the Chinese has been notably harsh in questioning Mao's legitimacy as a communist leader. An illustration of this line of Soviet attack, reminiscent of Moscow's virulent anti-Maoist polemics before the Sino-Soviet talks, is a commentary broadcast in Mandarin on 20 November denigrating Mao's thought. Using interpretive themes developed in Moscow's rewriting of Chinese communist history, the commentary portrays a history of struggle between the "internationalist, Marxist-Leninist line" in the CCP and the "petit-bourgeois, chauvinist line" represented by Mao's thought. It claims that Mao has been "greatly influenced by great-Han chauvinism," causing him to ignore the experience of the international communist movement.

Moscow has broken its silence on the recent recognition of the PRC by two U.S. allies, Canada and Italy. An article by D. Volskiy in the weekly NEW TIMES (No. 47) views Peking's expanding diplomatic ties with dark misgivings as an effort by the West to exploit China economically and to obstruct an improvement of Peking's relations with the Soviet bloc. Volskiy's articles in NEW TIMES have served as a principal channel for expressing Soviet concern over the implications of improved relations between the West and the PRC.

Suggesting that Washington's NATO partners are acting in the U.S. interest in developing links with the PRC, Volskiy offers two reasons why Washington cannot easily develop its own ties with Peking: the PRC does not want to advertise its contacts with the United States while conducting a propaganda campaign against American imperialism, and the Nixon Administration is inhibited by domestic political considerations from cultivating better relations with Peking. Calling attention to the key formula in the recognition statements in which Canada and Italy merely took note of Peking's claim to Taiwan rather than endorsing it, he suggests that this removes the central obstacle to improved relations between Peking and the West. Volskiy concludes by expressing concern over Western intentions to exploit Sino-Soviet tensions and notes that Peking has not rebutted these suspicions. Moreover, he adds archly, the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the establishment of PRC-Canadian diplomatic relations included a characteristic swipe at the superpowers, "thus making it understood what the trend of the present Chinese line is in foreign affairs."

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CHINESE Peking's anti-Soviet polemics have been marked by the  
COMMENT subdued tone inherent in the shift from a strident ideological campaign against Moscow's authority to a more flexible effort to contest Soviet as well as American dominance. The key theme is growing opposition to the superpowers. This theme was summed up in Chou En-lai's statement, in a 9 November speech marking Cambodia's national day, that "an increasing number of medium and small countries are rising one after another" to "oppose hegemony and oppose the aggression, control, and subjugation of the superpowers."

One of Peking's favorite countries in that category, Romania, has again been represented by a visiting delegation and praised for standing up to the Soviets. Li Hsien-nien, speaking on 21 November at a banquet for a Romanian delegation visiting Peking after signing an aid agreement in Hanoi, echoed the theme that more and more countries are resisting the superpowers and praised Romania for having denounced the doctrine of limited sovereignty. Li remarked pointedly that at the time of disastrous floods this year the Romanians "firmly resisted foreign pressure which attempted to compel Romania to abandon its independence and sovereignty by taking advantage of its difficulty." The Romanian guest found the point well taken, responding with gratitude to the Chinese for rendering "fraternal and timely aid--the greatest aid the Romanian people received from abroad." He also pointed out that Romania has consistently taken up the PRC's cause in the United Nations.

Another recent demonstration of Peking's ingenuity in pressing its case against the superpowers has been a campaign of support for the stand of 14 Latin American countries claiming 200 miles as the limits of their territorial waters. A PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on 20 November charged that the United States and "social imperialism" have colluded to impose a 12-mile limit on the Latin Americans and that the Soviets have revealed their "aggressive and expansionist features" by joining with the United States "in the dirty crime of plundering the Latin American countries." The editorial and supporting propaganda seek to play on resentment against U.S. and Soviet fishing operations and to capitalize on another area in which Peking hopes to acquire leverage against the superpowers.

While undertaking campaigns of this sort across various fronts, the Chinese have significantly muted their challenge to Moscow's ideological credentials. Peking's current ideological

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restraint was recently illustrated on the anniversary of the establishment of PRC-Albanian diplomatic relations; an occasion last year for sharp attacks on the Soviets. At an Albanian embassy reception on 23 November, Deputy Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua referred only in general terms to struggling against imperialism and revisionism. Last year on this occasion Deputy Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei lauded the Albanians for standing alongside the Chinese against "the Soviet modern revisionist leading clique" in order to "safeguard the purity of Marxism-Leninism." In the present phase Albania has seemed more valuable to Peking as a sponsor of its being seated in the United Nations than as an ally in the obsessive ideological campaigns of the past.

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## CHINA UN SEAT

## PEKING CALLS UNGA VOTE "SERIOUS DEFEAT" FOR UNITED STATES

The first Chinese comment on the UN General Assembly's 20 November vote on the China representation question, amounting to an unprecedented show of support for seating of the PRC, stresses the magnitude of the "serious defeat" sustained by the United States in a cause Peking suggests is foredoomed because it is "unjust." Conveyed, as in 1968 and 1969, in an NCNA dispatch,\* the Chinese comment on 22 November is notably devoid of any denigration of the United Nations as an organization--a consistent ingredient of Peking's reactions to prior votes on the issue. And where in prior years Peking gave extensive publicity only to the Albanian delegate's speech during the debate, this time it also widely distributed accounts of the debate calculated to demonstrate an increase in the PRC's prestige and a decline in support for the American position.

The NCNA dispatch of the 22d still accuses the two big powers of colluding via the UN machinery but aims its fire at the superpowers, not the United Nations. While Peking ceased after November 1967 to profess a lack of interest in joining the United Nations, the NCNA dispatches in 1968 and 1969 continued to disparage the organization as a "market place for political bargaining" between the United States and the Soviet Union and portrayed it as politically and morally bankrupt. Both also specifically censured Moscow for its passive stance on the China membership issue, allegedly in tacit collusion with Washington. This time, mentioning the Soviet Union only indirectly and ignoring its role in the debate, the dispatch simply charges the United States "and its accomplice" with "playing power politics and practicing hegemony" in the United Nations and suggests that their influence is waning. NCNA warns that if they persist in this course, they will either face "an even more shameful defeat" for themselves or "bring failure to the United Nations" and force it to go the way of the League of Nations.

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\* The 1967 vote occasioned a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, and the votes in 1965 and 1966 were discussed in PEOPLE'S DAILY editorials. In all three of those years Peking was disclaiming interest in a UN seat.

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Peking's focus is on the increasing isolation of the United States, with the vote pictured as a breach in the "dike of hostility toward China" constructed by the United States and hence as "an important victory for the Chinese people and the peoples of various countries upholding international justice." NCNA dismisses the U.S. shift in emphasis to retention of the Chinese Nationalist seat as a tactic adopted "for the sole purpose of misleading others so as to facilitate intensified pursuit of the 'two Chinas' or 'one China, one Taiwan' plot." In effect NCNA flatly rejects both as different names for the same thing--something "the Chinese people can never permit." A 17 November NCNA dispatch on the debate, in taking note of the U.S. delegate's speech, emphasized his opposition to expulsion of the Nationalists and suggested that the United States' effort "to extricate itself from its predicament in opposing China" through the creation of "a 'two Chinas' or 'one China, one Taiwan' plot" indicates that American policy "is in the grip of an unprecedented crisis."

ANALYSIS OF      Observing that "a just cause enjoys abundant  
UNGA VOTES      support while an unjust cause finds little  
                 support," the 22 November NCNA dispatch contrasts  
the "thunderous applause" that greeted the vote on the  
substantive question giving majority support to PRC admission  
with "silence" after the passage of the "illegal" resolution  
defining the issue as an "important question" requiring a  
two-thirds vote. Highlighting the 51-49 vote with 25  
abstentions on the 18-nation draft resolution demanding  
"restoration to the PRC of its legitimate seat in the United  
Nations and the immediate ousting of the Chiang Kai-shek clique,"  
the dispatch listed the 51 countries which had voted for the  
resolution. The "so-called 'important question'" vote was  
adopted, according to the dispatch, by U.S. "mustering" of  
"a handful of accomplices and lackeys such as the reactionary  
Sato government of Japan." Noting that compared with last  
year the votes for this resolution dropped by five, those  
against it increased by four, and the abstentions increased  
by three, NCNA says that "even those who voted for the draft  
did not applaud" when it was passed.

Quoting the comments of various delegates, including the  
Yugoslav, Ceylonese, and French, the NCNA dispatch stresses  
their arguments that the PRC's participation in the United  
Nations is important to the solution of world problems,  
that a two-Chinas solution is "entirely untenable," and that the  
important-question resolution is an "abuse of the UN Charter"  
since the issue is one of representation and not of admission  
of a new member.

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## MOSCOW UNDERSCORES CONSISTENT "PRINCIPLED" POSITION

Moscow's coverage of the UNGA debate and vote has stressed the Soviet Union's consistent and principled stand on the representation issue, with broadcasts in Mandarin evidently designed to ward off Chinese charges of Soviet-U.S. collusion by recalling past Soviet support for seating the PRC and opposition to a two-Chinas compromise.

On 12 November, the opening day of the debate, TASS took note of "increasing alarm" in the U.S. press over the prospect that "the die-hard policy of Washington might suffer a fiasco" and suggested that the United States might try to use the "back-stage maneuver" of a two-Chinas formula to preserve the Nationalist regime's representation. Commenting on this "change in the U.S. position," TASS on the 13th observed that at the next UNGA session the United States might advance or support a compromise proposal seating the PRC but preventing the Nationalists from being expelled. Subsequent accounts of the debate continued to dwell on the U.S. "two Chinas" offensive."

On 20 November, reporting the voting, TASS hailed the majority adoption of the substantive resolution as "a big victory for the forces of peace and progress," even though the vote was rendered noneffective and "a positive solution" was again precluded by the important-question procedural decision pushed through by the United States and its allies. The TASS report and a brief Mandarin broadcast to China on the 20th took particular note of Soviet delegate Malik's speech outlining the USSR's "explicit and consistent stand" and calling Peking's continued exclusion "extremely unfair," a "crude violation of the UN Charter." The Soviet delegate did not take part in the debate last year.

Citing both Malik's speech and Gromyko's 21 October address to the UNGA in which he urged PRC representation, Soviet commentaries in Mandarin on the 21st traced Soviet efforts to get the PRC seated in the past, called a compromise solution "wholly untenable," and reiterated the charge that the failure to seat the PRC "has damaged the prestige" of the United Nations. Moscow directly denied "rumors" about "collusion between two major powers spread by the Chinese propaganda machine" and decried efforts of "the delegations of certain countries" to "distort the Soviet stand on this issue."

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## AFRICA

## PEKING, MOSCOW OFFICIALLY DENOUNCE INVASION OF GUINEA

Peking and Moscow, anxious to preserve and strengthen their influence in Guinea, both reacted promptly and officially to President Sekou Toure's 22 November charges that his country was being invaded. But where Peking evinces some caution in supporting Toure's claim that Portugal is responsible and attempts to picture the United States as the prime mover, Moscow directs its attack squarely at Portugal. The Chinese condemned the invasion first in an authoritative PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the 23d, then in publicity for remarks by Chou En-lai to the Guinean charge d'affaires on the 24th, and finally in a government statement on the 25th. TASS had publicized a Soviet Government statement on the 24th. The government statements are the first from either country on a development relating to sub-Saharan Africa since November 1965, when Ian Smith declared the independence of Southern Rhodesia; Peking and Moscow issued government statements on 14 and 15 November, respectively.

Guinea has long been an object of rivalry between Moscow and Peking for increased influence in Africa. Moscow announced its first credit to the Sekou Toure regime in 1959 and is reported to have granted Guinea a sizeable new credit in 1969. Peking has been granting Guinea credits since 1960 and announced a new aid program for the country in 1969, covering among other things the reconstruction of the old Conakry-Kankan railway. NCNA reported on 2 November of this year that a new Guinea-Chinese protocol on economic and technical cooperation was signed in Peking, but gave no details.

Against this background it seems noteworthy that NCNA, in an unusual Chinese pickup of a Soviet statement of support for a third country, reported on 24 November that according to TASS and ADN, "the Soviet Government and the Foreign Ministry of the German Democratic Republic, respectively, have issued statements on the invasion of Guinea by foreign mercenary troops, expressing support for the Guinean people in their struggle to oppose armed aggression." ADN had carried the GDR statement on the 23d.

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CHINESE  
RESPONSE

The Chinese Government statement, like the earlier Commentator article, seeks to shift the main onus for the reported aggression to the United States. Accusing "Portuguese colonialists" of sending mercenary troops to invade Guinea, it goes on to charge that "they never would have dared" to launch the invasion without the support of "U.S. imperialism." Peking's apparent reluctance to direct its attack squarely at Lisbon, in addition to reflecting the problem of positively identifying the invading forces, may reflect concern to avoid disturbing relations with a regime with which Peking has achieved an accommodation on the status of Macao.

In his remarks to the Guinean charge d'affaires, as quoted by NCNA, Chou took a similar line in condemning "U.S. imperialism" for supporting "the Portuguese colonialists in dispatching mercenary troops to invade Guinea." He also expressed confidence that the Guinean people could repel the aggression. In the same vein, the PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article says it is up to "the people of Guinea and the African people as a whole to crush the invasion." The government statement of the 25th, assuring the Guinean people that "the Chinese people resolutely support you," concludes that "victory surely belongs to the Guinean people who, under the leadership of President Ahmed Sekou Toure, have strengthened their unity, heightened their vigilance, and persisted in the struggle!"

On the 23d, NCNA had publicized Radio Conakry reports on government claims of successes in repelling the invaders as well as Toure's appeal to African leaders to come to Guinea's aid. On the 24th, it publicized President Tito's condemnation of the invasion and his call for an immediate end to the hostilities. Predictably, Peking has not reported any UN activity in connection with the events in Guinea.

SOVIET  
STATEMENT

The Soviet Government statement directly accuses "Portugal" of committing "a criminal act of armed aggression" against Guinea and calls for an "immediate" end to the attack. An amphibious contingent composed of "forces of European and African mercenaries," it says, was sent from the Portuguese colony of Guinea (Bissau) to attack Conakry. Describing the action as "a cynical, provocative flouting of the principles of the UN Charter and international law, the statement adds that the Soviet Union, "resolutely supporting the Guinean people's struggle against the invaders, is supporting the African states' efforts designed to rebuff the aggressors." Although the statement views the invasion as part of a wider "imperialist" effort to suppress the national liberation movement, it makes no mention of the United States.

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Indirectly acknowledging the Portuguese denial of responsibility for the invasion, the Soviet statement says that "by whatever false statements the Portuguese colonialists make to cover up their actions, this is an open attempt to bring down the progressive regime in Guinea . . . ."

Radio Moscow observer Dimitriev on the 23d alleged that the United States supported the invasion but pictured it as a premeditated move by "the Portuguese authorities," who "were doubtless aware of their full responsibility for such a step." He said "the facts show that the Caetano government took this step consciously, after having secured support from the United States and other NATO countries." Dimitriev mentioned that the UN Security Council had adopted a resolution but did not spell out its substance. Moscow did not publicize Guinea's request for UN troops, rejected by the Security Council.

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## FRG - POLAND

## WARSAW HAILS TREATY, SILENT ON DOCUMENT ON GERMAN MINORITY

Poland and West Germany on 20 November both publicized the text of the treaty on normalization of relations between the two countries, but to date Polish media have not been heard to mention Warsaw's communication to the FRG--released by Hamburg's DPA on the 20th--on the "humanitarian" problem of the ethnic German minority in Poland. Polish propaganda throughout the period of the negotiations had characterized this problem as an internal one. Among others, an article in ZYCIE WARSZAWY on 10 November decried the efforts of "part of the FRG press" to characterize as a "German minority" those ethnic Germans who "of their own will" declared in favor of Poland and Polish citizenship. Regarding family reunification, the commentary stated that if normal relations and peaceful cooperation existed, "then many of the filed cases could be settled more easily and faster."\*

While Warsaw remains silent on the Polish communication to the FRG, the PAP report on the 18 November ceremony at the initialing of the treaty reports FRG Foreign Minister Scheel's hope that there could be rapid progress "in the complex of questions which we discussed in our negotiations under the concept of humanitarian problems."

Gomulka, addressing the Hungarian party's 10th congress on 24 November, called the FRG's treaties with the USSR and Poland turning points in Europe's postwar history and contributions to a new atmosphere favorable to the convening of a conference on European security. To further the process of normalization in Europe, he added, the FRG should recognize the GDR as an "equal international legal entity," and both states should be admitted to the United Nations.

A continuing substantial volume of routine Polish comment on the treaty rehashes familiar themes. Typically, a TRYBUNA LUDU article on the 19th calls the act of ratification the "litmus paper revealing social and political changes" in the FRG: "It will be a test showing European public opinion whether the forces of realism, coexistence, and goodwill have won broad support . . . or whether the FRG is still dominated by sinister feelings of nationalism, revenge, and intransigence."

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\* For further background on the minority problem, see the TRENDS of 14 October 1970, page 43.

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## SOVIET UNION, OTHER BLOC COUNTRIES WELCOME TREATY

Moscow's first authoritative comment on the initialing of the treaty comes from Brezhnev in his 24 November Budapest speech before the Hungarian party's 10th Congress. In the course of remarks on the "improved" political climate in Europe, the Soviet leader hailed the treaty and the FRG-Soviet accord signed in August as products of the continuing "principled policy" of the socialist countries and the "realistic position"--which he said reflected the mood of the West German public--taken by the FRG Government. The two treaties "create good prerequisites for deepening peaceful cooperation between European states in many fields," he said, and at the same time "protect the legitimate interests of the German Democratic Republic" and other socialist countries.

Earlier, low-volume Moscow comment had hailed the accord as a step which, along with the Moscow-Bonn treaty, strengthened European security and insured the inviolability of existing state frontiers. Routinely, the commentaries continued to warn of West German "revanchist forces" bent on blocking ratification of both documents.

Hungary's Kadar, like Brezhnev, took the occasion of his party's congress to welcome the treaty between Warsaw and Bonn and reaffirmed Hungary's readiness to establish normal relations with the FRG. Noting that the two countries have developed mutually advantageous economic and trade relations, he added that "once the situation becomes ripe, we are ready to build up our relations with the FRG still further, ultimately to the settlement of diplomatic relations."

Both Ceausescu and Zhivkov welcomed the treaty in speeches on the 19th in Sofia at a Bulgarian-Romanian friendship meeting, Zhivkov declaring that the "next step" should be the regulation of relations between the FRG and GDR.

Czechoslovak comment welcoming the treaty includes a 23 November Bratislava domestic service commentary which restates Czechoslovak interest in discussing normalization of relations with the FRG. Such negotiations, according to the commentary, "will start in the near future." Husak, however, mentioned neither the treaty nor issues relating to European security in his 24 November speech at the Hungarian congress.

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GDR REACTION      East German propaganda reaction at this writing is confined to routine comment portraying the accord as a product of the policies of the socialist states and a contribution to the strengthening of peace and security in Europe. True to form, the GDR comment plays up the existence of opposition voices seeking to block ratification; in the words of ADN on the 20th, these are "grouped together in the reactionary, revanchist rightwing bloc."

Available East German propaganda on the treaty does not mention the impending exchange of views between FRG and GDR representatives on relaxation of tensions in the center of Europe. A NEUES DEUTSCHLAND commentary on the 19th, however, says Bonn must now be expected "to carry through the realistic elements of its policy and to adopt with regard to the GDR a fully realistic attitude-- that is, to establish with the GDR relations of equal rights based on international law."

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## HUNGARIAN PARTY CONGRESS

## BREZHNEV REGISTERS GENERAL APPROVAL OF HUNGARIAN LINE

Addressing the 10th Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (MSZMP) on its second day, CPSU delegation head Brezhnev indicated more confidence in the moderately liberal Budapest party line than he had conveyed in his speech there last April on the occasion of the 25th Hungarian liberation anniversary. On that occasion he merely observed that "building socialism is a complex process," spoke of the importance of "firm reliance on Marxist-Leninist theory," and pointedly recalled a past statement by Kadar on the primacy of international over national interests.

Now, on 24 November, the Soviet leader declared that the Hungarian party's "principled" approach to the problems of building a socialist society has "the full understanding and high appraisal of the communists of the Soviet Union." In the speech as broadcast live in the Moscow domestic service, Brezhnev also said "great and truly creative work is being done by the MSZMP and its Central Committee, headed by that true son of the Hungarian people and outstanding and respected figure in the international communist and workers movement, Comrade Janos Kadar"--an accolade not, however, included in TASS' summary. In April Brezhnev had given a similarly phrased endorsement to Kadar personally but did not juxtapose it to praise for the Hungarian party's policies.

After underscoring growing coordination and "integration" of the socialist countries in CEMA and the Warsaw Pact, Brezhnev added a new warning against any repetition of the Czechoslovak episode: Stressing the importance of communist parties' "loyalty to Marxism-Leninism," he declared that "attempts by bourgeois ideologists and their revisionist helpers both from the right and 'the left' to push the builders of socialism and communism off the right track and create in their way a smokescreen of provocative fabrications, demagoguery, and falsifications are meeting with a due rebuff from the communists."

KADAR            In his report to the opening session of the congress on  
REPORT           the 23d, Kadar said what his Soviet guest wanted to hear  
                 in indicating that his "economic reform," initiated at  
the start of 1968, would be pursued only under conditions of  
ideological orthodoxy and firm loyalty to the Soviet Union. Thus,  
in passages highlighted in the TASS summary, Kadar conveyed assurances regarding his own brand of liberalism by rejecting "neutrality"

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in ideology and "unprincipled compromise and reconciliation" in politics, since his party "believes that Marxism-Leninism imposes on us certain commitments." With Dubcek-style reformers evidently in mind, he added that "it is impossible to approve principles and simultaneously refute them by deeds, to proclaim unity and at the same time instigate differences."

Kadar underscored his country's "growing economic ties to the CEMA member states" and declared that Hungary "has complied and will continue to comply with all its obligations arising" from membership in the Pact, phraseology bringing to mind Hungarian participation in the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Husak, addressing the congress the following day, devoted more than half of his speech to the 1968 "counterrevolutionary danger" and the "fraternal aid" given by the Soviet Union and its allies.\*

Kadar rejected "any form of anti-Sovietism" as "playing into the hands of the class enemy, imperialism," and denounced both right-wing revisionism and "pseudorevolutionary 'leftist' adventurism." Asserting an intent to promote "ever greater cooperation with every socialist country, even those from which we are divided by differences of opinion," Kadar was in tune with the current Soviet stance toward the Chinese in remarking that "despite our still prevailing serious and numerous ideological and political differences of opinion, to some extent our interstate relations with the PRC have improved."

RELATIONS WITH GDR With Walter Ulbricht absent from this congress as from the MSZMP's last one in December 1966 (he sent Politburo member Friedrich Ebert both times), Kadar went out of his way to picture Hungarian-East German relations as cordial. In the context of European security, he paid tribute to the role in European peace of "the first German worker-peasant state--our ally and friend, the GDR," adding that Hungarian-GDR relations "are fraternal, based on firm internationalist foundations of principle and policy." He went on to stress that "we have cooperated in the past and will continue to cooperate in the future in the interests of socialism, progress, and European security."

\* Budapest and Prague media on the 24th reported Kadar's statement.

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OTHER FOREIGN      Ulbricht's absence is the more conspicuous at  
REPRESENTATION      this year's decennial congress by virtue of  
                         the presence of Brezhnev, Gomulka, Husak, and  
Zhivkov. Brezhnev and Zhivkov attended in 1966, but the PZPR and  
the CPCZ were represented then by Politburo members Waniolka and  
Cernik, respectively, both since deposed.

Other ruling party representatives at the present congress are  
Romania's Niculescu-Mizil, Yugoslavia's Gligorov, the DRV's Hoang  
Van Hoan, the DPRK's Han Ik-su, and the MPR's Zagvaral, all Polit-  
buro-level figures, and Cuban party Central Committee member Fabio  
Grobart. Of the nonruling communist parties in attendance, all  
from Europe, those represented by their first secretaries are the  
West German KPD and the Greek, Irish, and Turkish CP's.

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## USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

## NEW CHIEF EDITOR NAMED FOR GOSPLAN'S MAIN JOURNAL

The chief editor of Gosplan's main organ, PLANNED ECONOMY, has been replaced by an obscure young economist from outside the Gosplan apparatus. The changeover occurred last summer, soon after the July Central Committee decision to raise allocations for agriculture in the new five-year plan.

While the new editor, candidate of economics Vladimir S. Glagolev, has not publicly associated himself with any particular faction or issue, his appointment coincides with recent signs of struggle over priorities and may mark another setback for Gosplan's leadership. Gosplan's original outlines for the new five-year plan were apparently overridden by the agriculture lobby, led by Polyanskiy and Brezhnev, and long-time party official T.I. Sokolov presumably was appointed to Gosplan's top ranks to protect agriculture against Gosplan's traditional industrial bias.

According to the November issue of ZHURNALIST, the only previous jobs held by the 33-year-old Glagolev have been as scientific editor of the Soviet Encyclopedia Publishing House (1960-66) and consultant to the political economy department of KOMMUNIST (1966-70). During this latter period he was living in Lithuania, where he was deputy director of the scientific organization of labor department of the Elfa electrical equipment plant (he was so identified the July 1968 issue of the Lithuanian journal KOMMUNIST). Two of his rare press articles were about his plant's scientific organization of labor--the July 1968 Lithuanian article and a June 1969 QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS article written from Vilnius. His only statements on important issues came in a March 1968 article in COMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES (No. 5), when, in discussing national resource allocations for the 1968-70 plans, he cautiously argued that defense and heavy industry could be further strengthened at the same time as consumer goods and welfare.

Dropped from the PLANNED ECONOMY editorial board were chief editor A.F. Kolosov and Gosplan party committee secretary V.N. Krylov. Kolosov, as chief editor, has been a prominent figure at many economic conferences and author of many articles (most recently, highly favorable reviews of a book on economic

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reform by liberal economists A.M. Romyantsev and P.G. Bunich in issue No. 8 and of Romyantsev's book on the science of society in issue No. 1). Kolosov was an official of one of Gosplan's research institutes when he was named chief editor in mid-1964.

Most of the incumbents on the editorial board are Gosplan officials. Most prominent among them is Gosplan deputy chairman A.V. Bachurin, who was temporarily chief editor in 1964.

Glagolev's appointment occurred between 20 July and 21 August, the dates when issues No 8 and 9 were signed to press--shortly after the success of the agricultural lobby was confirmed by the 2 July Central Committee plenum. Significantly, the first issue of PLANNED ECONOMY under Glagolev's editorship featured a lead article by new Gosplan first deputy chairman Sokolov pointedly warning planners against diverting resources from agriculture. ("Attempts to resolve particular economic problems at the expense of agricultural development must be decisively suppressed"). Brezhnev has issued similar warnings in the past against this persistent practice, and Sokolov was presumably shifted to Gosplan to prevent recurrences.

**STRUGGLE OVER PRIORITIES** Even though Kirilenko (14 April) and Brezhnev (21 April) declared as early as April that Gosplan was finishing the draft of the new 1971-75 five-year plan, Brezhnev on 12 June indicated that work on the draft was still continuing. Presumably, one of the main reasons for the delay was the effort to increase agriculture's share--an effort occasioned by agricultural problems, especially meat shortages, apparent in early 1970.

In an article in the April SOVIETS OF WORKERS DEPUTIES (signed to press 20 March) agricultural spokesman Polyanskiy made an open appeal for more resources for agriculture in the new plan, while Brezhnev himself in his 13 April speech declared that the country could now invest considerably more in agriculture than before. On 21 April Brezhnev blamed errors in planning for many of the country's economic difficulties.

These statements coincided with organizational changes designed to improve agriculture's leverage in the government. On 11 April PRAVDA announced the appointment of two prominent oblast first secretaries--both long-time agricultural specialists--to high-level government posts: Stavropol First

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Secretary L.N. Yefremov became first deputy chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology, and Orel First Secretary T.I. Sokolov became Gosplan first deputy chairman. Their subsequent activities confirmed their special agricultural responsibilities.\* Previously there had been no deputy chairman of the science and technology committee for agriculture, and Gosplan had only had one deputy chairman, out of about a dozen, for agriculture. In contrast, some branches were represented by first deputy chairmen in Gosplan--for example, V. Ya. Isayev for construction.

This was followed by an apparent reevaluation of Gosplan's draft plan. In his 2 July Central Committee report Brezhnev stated that in May a special report "On the Situation in Agriculture" was presented to the Politburo, which approved its proposals and adopted a decree increasing the volume of investment and material-technical equipment for agriculture.

At a late May Council of Ministers session Kosygin reported on the basic directions of the new plan, and Brezhnev took the unusual step of addressing the Council of Ministers also (PRAVDA, 2 June). On 1 June Brezhnev spoke to the RSFSR Council of Ministers on the directions of the new plan, while RSFSR Premier Voronov--who has displayed little enthusiasm for increasing agricultural allocations--apparently did not speak at his own cabinet's session. On 3 June Polyanskiy could state that the new plan would allot unprecedented investments to agriculture.

By early July the agricultural figures had been worked out, and a Central Committee plenum was held on 2 July to approve the increased allocations to agriculture. In his report at this plenum Brezhnev reiterated that the 24th party congress would be held this year, indicating that he expected the plan to be ready by then to submit to the congress. But on 13 July another Central Committee plenum was held and the congress was postponed until March 1971. On 16 July the Council of Ministers met and instructed Gosplan to get together with the ministries and republic agencies to do more work on the draft plan. As of now, the drafts for the nonagricultural sections of the five-year plan have still not been completed. The draft annual

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\* For instance, Yefremov heads the science-technology committee's joint interdepartmental council on problems of agriculture, water, and forestry. (RURAL LIFE, 9 October).

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plan for 1971 was completed and considered by a November Council of Ministers session (IZVESTIYA, 12 November) and will be adopted by a December Supreme Soviet session.

#### TERMINATION OF KAZAKH LINK EXPERIMENT PROVOKES CONTROVERSY

The decision of the Kazakh Ministry of Agriculture to discontinue a highly controversial and much publicized link experiment in the village of Akchi has touched off another round of heated exchanges between proponents and opponents of the link system of farm labor organization. The news of the official action, which apparently occurred last July, is reported in LITERARY GAZETTE No. 47 for 18 November, along with a number of articles representing sharply divergent views on the results of the link experiment and the action of the Kazakh ministry. In presenting the articles for publication the editors of LITERARY GAZETTE declare that they differ not only on questions of principle but on points of fact and interpretation as well.

The experiment in question was initiated two years ago in a Kazakh sovkhos selected as the testing ground for the radical ideas of Kazakh economist Ivan Khudenko, an ardent advocate of the link system and a severe critic of bureaucratic controls.\* The most striking features of the experiment were the miniscule size of the farm's administrative staff (consisting of farm director Mikhail Li and Khudenko) and the "commercial" principles under which its labor force of specialized links operated. As a result of these reforms the farm was reported to have achieved unusually high rates of productivity and pay.

A similar experiment conducted by Khudenko in the early 1960's had also been suspended as a result of bureaucratic haggling over the farm's finances and unorthodox methods of operation. The earlier suspension was followed by an acrimonious dispute which eventually led to the resumption of the experiment on another farm in 1968.

CHARGE OF PROFITEERING      Although the editors of LITERARY GAZETTE give no explanation for the discontinuation of the Kazakh experiment, some of the reason's may be inferred from the divergent commentaries appearing in the paper. An article by two critics of the experiment, V. Merkulov

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\* For background, see FBIS SURVEYS for 19 June 1969, pages 10-14 and 26 March 1970, pages 13-16.

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and V. Chupeyev, focuses on the high wages received by the farm's personnel, which, in their view, were excessive and amounted to profiteering at the state's expense. The critics assert the wages on the farm were entirely unrelated to production, and that the experiment was motivated solely by considerations of monetary gain. "The alpha and the omega of the whole experiment was 250 rubles a month," they charge. They add that Khudenko himself was receiving an average monthly wage of almost 1,000 rubles, while some farm personnel received "not less" and others "even more." In addition, they allege that the farm's crops were in a "deplorable condition" and that its yields of barley and lucerne were "shamefully low."

These charges are accompanied by an effort to discredit the highly favorable accounts of the farm's operations that appeared in LITERARY GAZETTE earlier this year. For example, they ridicule the figures on the farm's labor productivity (7,200 rubles per man in 1969) cited by N. Alekseyev and V. Kokashinskiy in their 4 March article and assert that no one on the farm, not even Khudenko, knew where such a figure had come from. The correct figure, in their view, was 1,834 rubles, which they claim was lower than that of neighboring farms. They also charge, in sharp contradiction to Alekseyev and Kokashinskiy, that the farm operated at a loss of more than 72,000 rubles in 1969.

In presenting these charges, Merkulov and Chupeyev draw up a general indictment against the proponents of the link system, accusing them of naivete and of adopting a "lightminded approach to agricultural problems." Agricultural progress, they maintain, cannot be obtained by panaceas--"by a wave of the wand"--but only by hard work and large allocations of labor and material resources.

LINK SPOKESMEN  
REMAIN ADAMANT

The indictment against Khudenko's farm is countered by a construction engineer, V. Filatov, who, together with three other engineers, joined the farm last year after reading a favorable account about it in LITERARY GAZETTE. Filatov describes how he and his associates, working in a construction link, built a system of water mains in the village and succeeded--where other farms had failed--in installing imported equipment for the production of grass meal. While expressing pride in these accomplishments and in those performed by the farm's field links, Filatov admits that they were carried out in flagrant

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disregard of bureaucratic practice. "Everything was done rapidly," he writes, "but . . . in violation of established procedure." While conceding the possibility that some of the farm's labor force had been overpaid, he points to other instances in which farm funds were underspent.

In general, Filatov concedes little to the farm's critics. He vigorously defends the experiment in Akchi and praises Khudenko's "honest and open" qualities of leadership. As a result of this leadership, he argues, the farm's assets increased by 500,000 rubles during the brief tenure of the experiment. He concludes by questioning the rationale for the governmental action.

The experiment is also defended by L. Grushetskiy, an economist with the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of the Economics of Agriculture, who visited Kazakhstan twice this year to investigate the controversy over Khudenko's farm. He praises the various projects described by Filatov and points to other areas in which the farm excelled over its neighbors: in the use of machinery and in the ratio of administrators to laborers. He reveals that the ratio in Khudenko's farm is 1:40, as against 1:3.6 in neighboring farms, and he berates Khudenko's critics for ignoring the economic implications of these figures--the high cost of maintaining the cumbersome farm bureaucracy.

Grushetskiy defends the farm's production record with the claim that it produced 70 percent of the republic's output of grass meal in 1969. Moreover, citing data from the records of the republic's agricultural and finance ministries, he disputes the figures of Merkulov and Chupeyev on the farm's productivity. He uses the official data to argue that the farm was a highly productive and profitable enterprise in 1969, belieing allegations that the farm's income grew more rapidly than its labor productivity.

In defense of the high wages in Khudenko's farm, Grushetskiy cites an article by Moscow oblast first secretary V. Konotop in KOMMUNIST No. 11 which commended the productive achievements of a mechanized link led by V. Papkov. Grushetskiy notes that the members of Papkov's link received an average monthly wage of 440 rubles in 1969 and that the system of wages approved by Konotop was identical to that used in Khudenko's farm. While cautioning against a "one-sided" approach to the question of wages, Grushetskiy stresses the importance of material incentives and the need for an "unprejudiced" approach to them.

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Grushetskiy not only judges the experiment to be a success and recommends its resumption, but also calls for its application elsewhere. In particular, he relates the experiment to the official goal of placing the sovkhos system on a sound economic footing. In his view, the experiment in Akchi demonstrates the possibility of converting sovkhoses to full cost accounting from the very moment of conversion. The experiment, he adds, contradicts the views of those economists who believe that additional budgetary expenditures are needed to accomplish the transfer of unprofitable sovkhoses to full cost accounting.

In reporting the Kazakh decision and publicizing the controversy over it, the editors of LITERARY GAZETTE no doubt consider the issues involved to be of national significance. In any case, the publicity is bound to generate pressures for a review of the decision of the Kazakh farm bureaucracy. The existence of pressures in favor of such experiments may be gauged by the steady flow of favorable commentary on the link system in the central press.

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## P R C I N T E R N A L A F F A I R S

## RECENT SHIFTS IN PRC ECONOMIC RATIONALE EXAMINED

While the average cadre in China may have reason to feel slightly more at ease today than during the height of the cultural revolution, he is still being pulled this way and that by contradictory advice, appeals, and injunctions. The continuing voluminous propaganda campaign for increased study of Mao's philosophy makes it clear that the cadre is expected to devote more time to ideological concerns. He is simultaneously warned that production must be increased dramatically.

The cadre's problem, however, is not simply a matter of determining the correct mix between production and revolution. He is not being told clearly what line to follow on production issues. During the past few months the propaganda media have enunciated several clearly different views--with supporting Mao quotations--concerning the basis for economic growth in China and how this growth can best be stimulated. In general the articles seem to indicate some shift in priorities toward a concentration on heavy industry, but this trend is far from universal.

A Canton radio commentary broadcast on 17 November devoted most of its time to a paean of praise for the province's achievements in light industry over recent months. Yet it also discussed in unusually blunt fashion the problem of the relative priority between light and heavy industry, making a clear statement that where resources are limited heavy industry should get the nod. The article noted that at the beginning of the year, when state resources were being allocated, "some cadres unilaterally emphasized the importance of light industry." Leading departments, however, guided the cadres to a study of Mao's old dictum that priority must be given heavy industry "so that technique and equipment can be supplied to agriculture and light industry."

PRC media have commented several times during the year on instances of raw material shortages, but there have been no previous commentaries that so clearly stated the primacy of heavy industry in the competition with light industry for materials. The two have usually been portrayed as of approximately equal stature, as in a PEOPLE'S DAILY article last August which called for relatively independent local industrial systems "including heavy and light industry." This article, released by NCNA in English on 27 August, discussed the

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relative attention to be paid to small, medium, and large-scale industrial plants. While there is no necessary correlation between the size of a plant and its status in heavy or light industry--local tractor plants, blast furnaces, and so forth can be regarded as heavy industry--most small local plants would be unfavorably affected by an enforcement of Canton's dictum on the priority of heavy industry.

Thus Canton's line seems to run contrary to the thesis propounded in the PEOPLE'S DAILY article, to the effect that more small and medium enterprises are the current need. PEOPLE'S DAILY argued that in view of China's situation today, and even though large-scale enterprises are "the mainstay," small and medium enterprises must be allowed to increase production rapidly (no preference as to types of goods, heavy or light, was stated). The more such enterprises produce, "the more capital the state will accumulate and the more rapidly the technical force will grow"; then additional large enterprises will be feasible.

A similar theory of growth was advanced in an article by the writing group of the Ministry of Commerce, released by NCNA on 20 October. But a different factor was portrayed as being of prime importance to the growth rate. The article dredged up a Mao quotation from another period which stated categorically that "the scale and speed of development of industry and other construction undertakings are mainly determined by the amount of marketable grain, industrial raw materials, and labor force that agriculture can provide, and by the amount of industrial products that agriculture can consume." As evidence for this thesis, the article noted that since 1949 industry has grown more in years with good harvests.

Like the writer for PEOPLE'S DAILY, the Ministry of Commerce authors apparently favor the notion of turning out more products more quickly, in the belief that output can generate demand. "Some comrades" who try to maintain a balance in which production responds to demand are said to fail to understand that "imbalance is constant and absolute." It is, however, conceded that "when absolutely necessary" appropriate, planned readjustment may be made.

While the Ministry of Commerce article did not raise the issue of industrial priorities, central media have previously indicated some shift in the direction of heavy industry. An article on local industry in RED FLAG No. 10 in October called for "vigorous

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development" of local industry, but warned that overall plans must be followed. One county in Heilungkiang was praised for discontinuing "a number of enterprises which should not have been run due to the lack of the necessary conditions and for adding a number of basic enterprises, raw material enterprises, and enterprises serving agriculture." Light industrial plants producing simple farm instruments to the detriment of production of large and medium-sized farm machinery were specifically mentioned as having been discontinued.

But the cadre concerned for his future is wise to hedge his bets; there is no single answer. On 15 October NCNA reported on a commune in Hunan Province which had erred initially in "buying only big machines from the state" and thereby slowed mechanization. Now the commune's leadership sees that it must "walk on two legs," combining big machines with improved tools on the principle of advancing "from simple to modern methods step by step, from a lower level to a higher."

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